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INTRODUCTION
In the past fifty years, Native American tribal reservations have 
emerged as enticing locations and partnership opportunities for out-
side businesses. As tribes are sovereign nations, not subject to many 
of the regulations and taxes that are found off-reservation, has led to 
an explosion of business and a potential for investors. However, this 
unique status that provides an opportunity for great wealth also comes 
with the issue of enforceability of contracts; two prevalent issues are 
the enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses and the collection of 
awards. Although reservations were not historically viewed as desirable 
business locations, some businesses, particularly those involved in pay-
day lending, have now begun to utilize the jurisdictional complications 
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for their benefits. It is important to understand that the arbitration and 
forum selection clause issues within contracts between Native American 
tribes and non-Native American businesses or individuals have not been 
settled by the courts and are ongoing, as demonstrated by the pending 
appeal in Jackson v. Payday Financial Inc.1 and Inetianbor v. CashCall, 
Inc.2 and the recent reversal and remand by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit in Jackson v. Payday Financial, LLC.3
Part II will explore the historical approach to the use of arbitration 
clauses in contracts between Native American tribes and non-Native 
Americans, including the unique nature of Native American tribal sover-
eignty and sovereign immunity. Part III will discuss the Supreme Court 
cases of C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian 
Tribe of Oklahoma4 and Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing 
Technologies, Inc.5 Additionally, Part III will examine the following 
developments: how tribes and tribal courts are currently addressing dis-
putes, awards, jurisdiction, and the appeals process; the use of clauses 
such as forum selection clauses invoking tribal jurisdiction today; and 
the recent involvement of arbitration clauses within contracts between 
Native American tribes and non-Native Americans. Finally, Part IV will 
address policy recommendations.
1  2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94095 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2012), appeal docketed, No. 12-
2617 (7th Cir., Sept. 21, 2012).
2  2013 WL 4494125 (S.D.Fla. 2013), appeal docketed, No. 13-13822 (11th Cir., 
Oct. 30, 2013).
3  No. 12-2617, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16257 (7th Cir., Aug. 22, 2014).
4  532 U.S. 411 (2011).
5  523 U.S. 751 (1998).
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I. Rise of Arbitration, Native American Tribal Sovereign 
Immunity & Jurisdiction
a. History of Arbitration
Although modern arbitration in the United States was not common 
until the early 1920s,6 it existed before the time of Alexander the Great7 
and is even mentioned in George Washington’s will.8 As with many 
of our legal procedures, the United States inherited arbitration from 
England, where the agreement to arbitrate commercial disputes was first 
referred to in 1224.9 Massachusetts became the first colony to adopt 
laws supporting arbitration in 1632.10 Modern arbitration in the United 
States was born in 1925 with the adoption of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, which “shaped modern arbitration” and changed the way business 
would be conducted.11 However, prior to the arrival of Europeans in the 
Americas, Native American tribes used arbitration to settle both dis-
putes within and between tribes.12
Within business contracts, mandatory arbitration clauses are very 
common and are utilized as a tool to keep disputes out of court and, 
in many cases, minimize potential losses.13 Between 1990 and 2001, 
6  See Richard A. Bales, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN 
EMPLOYMENT 5 (1997) (CITING FRANCES KELLOR, ARBITRATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION: 
A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1952)).
7  Id.; see Robin Lane Fox, The Search for Alexander 113-14 (1980) (noting that 
Philip II of Macedonia, Alexander the Great’s father, specified the use of arbitration 
in disputes that may arise under his peace treaty with city-states in southern Greece in 
337 B.C.).
8  See Bales, supra note 5, at 5 (The first President of the United States’ will 
provided that any disputes regarding his intention would be resolved by a panel of 
three arbitrators and that the decision of the arbitrators would be “as binding on the 
Parties as if it had been given in the Supreme Court of the United States”) (citing Am. 
Arbitration Ass’n, Arbitration News 2 (1963)).
9  See Marvin F. Hill, Jr. & Anthony V. Sinicropi, Improving the Arbitration Process: 
A Primer for Advocates, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 463, 465 (1991).
10  See Steven A. Certilman, A Brief History of Arbitration in the United States, 3 
N.Y. Dispute Resolution Lawyer 10, 10 (2010).
11  See Byron Allyn Rice, Comment, Enforceable or Not?: Class Action Waivers in 
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and the Need for a Judicial Standard, 45 Hous. L. Rev. 
215, 221 (2008-09).
12  See Certilman, supra note 9, at 10; see Robert V. Massey, Jr., History of Arbitration 
and Grievance Arbitration in the United States, http://www.laborstudiesandresearch.
ext.wvu.edu/r/download/32003 (last visited Dec. 1, 2013).
13  See Comment, Enforceable or Not?, supra note 10, at 217-18.
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over one million cases were filed with the American Arbitration 
Association—this exceeded the total number that had been filed in the 
sixty-five years since its formation.14 Although arbitration clauses have 
been prevalent for some time, within the past few years the clauses 
themselves, and criticisms about them, have been highlighted more 
in both the public media and in the judicial sphere, particularly those 
which involve financial services.15 Arbitration is criticized as being a 
“pay-for-justice phenomenon” due to the fact that the purportedly neu-
tral decisionmaker is dependent on those who pay for the service.16 It is 
thought to be relatively unregulated, as cases are decided “out of public 
view, leaving no record or legal precedent.”17
Although there has been an increase in criticisms, there has been 
a trend among the courts to be more accepting of arbitration agree-
ments, especially those with class action waivers or mandatory arbitra-
tion. Most recently, in 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a class 
action waiver contained in an arbitration agreement was enforceable, 
even though the plaintiffs showed the waiver effectively prevented them 
from bringing a federal antitrust claim, since the litigation of the claim 
would be prohibitively expensive.18 In most domestic cases, the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which provides for judicial facilitation of pri-
vate dispute resolution through arbitration, controls contracts executed 
under federal and state law.19 However, due to the sovereign nature of 
Native American tribes in the United States, the enforcement of arbitra-
tion clauses has not been a smooth road.
14  Id. at 221; see Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Fair Play: Perspectives From AAA On 
Consumer and Employment Arbitration 7 n.2 (2002).
15  In April of 2012, the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau launched a public 
inquiry into arbitration clauses and how consumers and financial services companies 
are affected by them. See CFPB Launches Public Inquiry into Arbitration Clauses, 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.
gov/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-launches-public-inquiry-into-
arbitration-clauses/.
16  See Comment, Enforceable or Not?, supra note 10, at 222 (citing Eric Berkowitz, 
Is Justice Served?, L.A. Times, Oct. 22, 2006, at 20).
17  Id.
18  See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); see also 
Class Actions—Class Arbitration Waivers—American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 278 (2013).
19  See 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (2014); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) 
(holding that the Federal Arbitration Act applied to contracts executed under state law).
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Under the FAA, arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract.”20 This provision “permits agreements to 
arbitration to be invalidated by generally applicable contract defenses, 
such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,” provided those defenses do 
not “apply only to arbitration or . . . derive their meaning from the fact 
that an agreement to arbitration is at issue.”21 Unconscionability may be 
procedural or substantive:
Procedural unconscionability consists of some impropri-
ety during the process of forming the contract depriving 
a party of meaningful choice. . . . Factors to be consid-
ered in determining whether an agreement is procedur-
ally unconscionable include whether each party had 
the opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, 
whether important terms were hidden in a maze of fine 
print, and all of the circumstances surrounding the for-
mation of the contract. . . . Substantive unconscionability 
concerns the actual terms of the contract and examines 
the relative fairness of the obligations assumed, ask-
ing whether the terms are so onesided as to oppress or 
unfairly surprise an innocent party.22
Concern over unconscionability remains one of the most signifi-
cant arguments against binding arbitration clauses; in particular forum 
selection clauses in which the chosen “forum” is distant and the legal 
proceedings would be foreign. This concern has become more prevalent 
in financial services contracts, specifically payday lending, as will be 
further discussed below.
b. Sovereign Immunity of Tribes
One of the main roadblocks to arbitration is sovereign immunity; 
since if it is left intact through the lack of a waiver, a federal or state 
court lacks the power to hear or decide the litigation. Tribal sovereign 
immunity is a judicially created doctrine which first came to light in 
1940, when the U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v. United States 
Fidelity & Guarantee Co., held that Native American tribes retain an 
20  9 U.S.C. § 2.
21  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011).
22  Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Rosen, 949 N.E.2d 639, 647 (Ill. 2011).
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inherent right to claim tribal sovereign immunity,23 including suit from 
states.24 In the past seventy years, the Court has continued to expand 
and hold that suits against tribes are barred “absent a clear waiver by the 
tribe or congressional abrogation” and that the waiver of tribal immunity 
“cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.”25 In Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Court explicitly stated “Indian tribes have 
long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from 
suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.”26
Although the federal government, foreign nations, and states have 
sovereign immunity in principle, tribal sovereign immunity is unique 
since many states have waived immunity when the government is 
involved in a proprietary or commercial activity. 27 The federal govern-
ment’s immunity is similar because the immunity is not limited to the 
tribe’s governmental functions, but it also applies to commercial and 
proprietary tribal government functions.28 Tribal immunity’s roots can 
be found in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, where the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that Native American tribes within the United States are “not for-
eign state[s] in the sense of the Constitution” but are “domestic depen-
dent nations.”29
Given the unique nature of tribal sovereign immunity, there are two 
main reasons it exists: (1) the need to protect the economic viability of 
23  See 309 U.S. 506, 512-13 (1940); see also Brian C. Lake, The Unlimited Sovereign 
Immunity of Indian Businesses Operating Outside the Reservation: An Idea Whose 
Time Has Gone, 1996 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 87, 89 (1996).
24  See Three Affiliated Tribes v. World Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986) (holding that 
states may not infringe upon the sovereign immunity of Native American tribes).
25  See Okla. Tax Comm. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 
(1991).
26  Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
27  See William V. Vetter, Doing Business with Indians and the Three “S”es: 
Secretarial Approval, Sovereign Immunity, and Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 36 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 169, 173 (1994) (noting that tribal immunity is broader than state immunity since 
many states do not recognize or waive immunity in situations when the government is 
involved in a proprietary or commercial activity).
28  Id. The United States is immune from suits unless it has waived immunity, through 
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674, and the Tucker Act, 27 U.S.C. 
§§ 1346(a), 1491, or has consented to the suit.
29  30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831).
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the tribes and (2) recognition of their status as separate sovereigns.30 
Regarding the first factor, the Eighth Circuit wisely stated that “[a]s rich 
as the . . . Nation is to be in lands and money, it would soon be impov-
erished if it was subject to the jurisdiction of the courts, and required 
to respond to all the demands which parties chose to prefer against 
it.”31 The recognition of sovereignty is vital and, since the arrival of the 
Europeans and the creation of the United States, the United States has 
treated and recognized Native American tribes as sovereigns and negoti-
ated with their representatives.32 The Eighth Circuit also stated that “[i]
t has been the policy of the United States to place and maintain the . . . 
Nation and other civilized Indian Nations in the Indian Territory, so far 
as relates to suits against them, on the plane of independent states.”33
Another difficulty with tribal sovereign immunity is determining 
if a commercial entity is separate from the Native American tribe. An 
entity that “ha[s] a distinct, nongovernmental character” is not immune, 
but an entity that is “merely an administrative convenience, i.e., a ‘sub-
ordinate [tribal] economic organization’” is immune.34 Lower courts 
have looked to numerous factors to determine if an entity is subordinate 
to the tribal government, including: (1) if the entity is organized under 
tribal constitution or laws (rather than federal law); (2) if the organiza-
tion’s purpose(s) are similar to a tribal government’s (e.g., promoting 
tribal welfare, alleviating unemployment, providing money for tribal 
programs); (3) if the organization’s managing body is necessarily com-
posed primarily of tribal officials (e.g., organization’s board is, by law, 
controlled by tribal council members); (4) if the tribe’s governing body 
has the unrestricted power to dismiss members of the organization’s 
governing body; (5) if the organization (and/or its governing body) 
“acts for the tribe” in managing organization’s activities; (6) if the tribe 
is the legal owner of property used by the organization, with title held in 
30  See Alexander Hogan, Protecting Native American Communities by Preserving 
Sovereign Immunity and Determining the Place of Tribal Businesses in the Federal 
Bankruptcy Code, 43 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 569, 572 (2011-12) (discussing the 
historical reasoning for tribal sovereign immunity).
31  Id.; Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372, 376 (8th Cir. 1895).
32  See David H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson, Robert A. Williams, Jr., & Matthew 
L.M. Fletcher, Introduction: Indians and Indian Law, Cases & Materials on Federal 
Indian Law 2 (2011).
33  See Hogan, supra note 29, at 572; Thebo, 66 F. at 375.
34  See Vetter, supra note 26, at 176 (discussing the difficulty of determining if an 
entity is separate or connected to a Native American tribe).
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the tribe’s name; (7) if the organization’s administrative and/or account-
ing activities are controlled or exercised by tribal officials; and (8) if 
the organization’s activities take place primarily on the reservation.35 
It is important to note that these are simply the factors that the courts 
examine, but not all are necessary to find an entity subordinate of the 
tribal government.36
The final issue lies in determining if the activity took place in 
“Indian country.” Although 18 U.S.C. § 1151 is a criminal statute, it 
“generally applies to questions of civil jurisdiction.”37 18 U.S.C. § 1151 
defines “Indian country” as:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 
1156 of this title, the term “Indian country,” as used in 
this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any 
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United 
States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any 
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through 
the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities 
within the borders of the United States whether within 
the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, 
and whether within or without the limits of a state, and 
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have 
not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running 
through the same.38
In the early 1990s, the Court held that “dependent Indian communi-
ties” include any “area . . . validly set apart for the use of Indians as 
such, under the superintendence of the Government,”39 and recognized 
35  Vetter, supra note 26, at 177 (citing Dixon v. Picopa Const. Co., 772 P.2d 1104 
(Ariz. 1989); Smith Plumbing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 720 P.2d 499 (Ariz.), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 
696 P.2d 223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); S. Unique, Ltd. v. Gila River Pima-Maricopa 
Indian Cmty., 674 P.2d 1376 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984), review denied (1984); White 
Mountain Apache Indian Tribe v. Shelley, 480 P.2d 654 (Ariz. 1971); Morgan v. Colo. 
River Indian Tribe, 443 P.2d 421 (Ariz. 1968)).
36  Vetter, supra note 26, at 177.
37  Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998) (“Although 
[the statute] by its terms relates only to . . . criminal jurisdiction, . . . it also generally 
applies to questions of civil jurisdiction . . . .”); see also William Wood, It Wasn’t an 
Accident: The Tribal Sovereign Immunity Story, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1589 n.4 
(2013) (discussing the distinction between what is “Indian country” and what is not).
38  18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2013).
39  See Okla. Tax Comm. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. at 511.
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that Congress intended to eschew technical distinctions in land tenure 
and “defined Indian country broadly, . . . [intending] to designate as 
Indian country all lands set aside by whatever means for the residence 
of tribal Indians under federal protection, together with trust and 
restricted Indian allotments.”40 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit deter-
mined a tribal housing project was a “dependent Indian community,” 
and articulated a test to determine if a particular area is a “dependent 
Indian community.”41
Under Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, “a waiver of sovereign 
immunity ‘cannot be implied, but must be unequivocally expressed.”42 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a special mode of statutory 
construction when a statute affects Native American interests, and in 
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians the Court held that “statutes are 
to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provi-
sions interpreted to their benefit.”43 Courts use this method of statutory 
interpretation to determine whether a statute has waived a tribe’s sover-
eign immunity, and courts have only found a waiver when Congress has 
explicitly stated that the statute is meant to remove tribal immunity.44
Although the concept of tribal sovereign immunity is similar 
to that of the immunity afforded to the federal government, to state 
40  Okla. Tax Comm. v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 125 (1993) (citing Felix 
Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 34 (1982 ed.)).
41  See United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 
459 U.S. 823 (1982). The test articulated by the Eighth Circuit includes looking at 
several factors: (1) whether the U.S. has retained “title to the lands which it permits 
the Indians to occupy” and “authority to enact regulations and protective laws 
respecting this territory”; (2) “the nature of the area in question, the relationship of 
the inhabitants of the area to Indian tribes and to the federal government, and the 
established practice of government agencies towards the area”; (3) whether there is 
“an element of cohesiveness . . . manifested either by economic pursuits in the area, 
common interest, or needs of the inhabitants as supplied by that locality”; and (4) 
“whether such lands have been set apart for the use, occupancy, and protection of 
dependent Indian peoples.” Id. at 839.
42  See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58 (holding that suits against a tribe under 
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 are barred by the tribe’s sovereign immunity since 
nothing on the face of ICRA purported to subject tribes to the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts).
43  471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).
44  See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 60 (“Although Congress clearly has power 
to authorize civil actions against tribal officers . . . a proper respect both for tribal 
sovereignty and for the plenary authority of Congress in this area cautions that we 
tread lightly in the absence of clear indication of legislative intent”).
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governments, and to foreign nations, tribal sovereign immunity is much 
broader. Under the Tucker Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act, the 
federal government has waived immunity from tort liability and from 
liability arising out of its commercial activities.45 Although the federal 
government cannot limit state sovereign immunity,46 many states have 
waived immunity in a manner similar to the federal government in the 
Federal Tort Claims Act,47 and states are subject to suit by both the 
federal government and by other states. Furthermore, foreign states no 
longer have immunity for commercial activities in the United States due 
to the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.48 However, tribal sover-
eign immunity still remains in most circumstances,49 but there are some 
indications of limitations to come under the strong dissents of Justices 
45  See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491(Tucker Act of 1887) (2014) (providing 
federal jurisdiction for a variety of non-tort claims against the United States); 28 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (Federal Tort Claims Act of 1947) (West 2014) (provides 
government damage liability for acts by the United States or its employees for any 
“negligent or wrongful acts or omissions . . . in the same manner and to the same extent 
as a private individual under like circumstances.”).
46  See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment 
re-affirms that states possess sovereign immunity and, thus, are generally immune 
from being sued in federal court without waiving that immunity); Alden v. Maine, 
527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution does not provide 
Congress with the ability to subject a state, without their consent, to private suits for 
damages in state court); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding 
that the Eleventh Amendment precludes Congress from abrogating state sovereign 
immunity in the federal courts pursuant to any of its Article I powers); see also Coll. 
Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 684-86 
(1999) (declining to limit state sovereign immunity to non-commercial activities and 
suggesting that Congress might also lack the authority to do so).
47  See State Sovereign Immunity and Tort Liability, National Conference of 
State Legislatures (Sept, 8, 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/
state-sovereign-immunity-and-tort-liability.aspx (providing a table of statutes and 
constitutional provisions for all 50 states and the District of Columbia related to 
sovereign immunity and tort claims against the state); see generally Jonathan R. Siegel, 
Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the Ideology of the Eleventh Amendment, 52 
Duke L.J. 1167 (2003) (discussing waivers of sovereign immunity by states).
48  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2011).
49  See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 757-59 (noting the restrictions on tribal immunity “in 
limited circumstances” by Congress, including mandatory liability insurance under 
the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C.S. § 450f(c)(3) 
(2011), gaming activities under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, § 2710(d)(7)(A)
(ii) (2011), etc.).
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Ginsburg, Thomas, and Ginsburg in the recent decision of Michigan v. 
Bay Mills Indian Community.50
c. Jurisdiction
In addition to the concern about sovereign immunity, there is a ques-
tion as to whether the tribal arbitration tribunals/courts are the proper 
jurisdiction. The first Supreme Court case to deal with civil jurisdic-
tion by tribal courts against non-tribal members was Williams v. Lee in 
1959.51 The Court held that a state court did not have jurisdiction to try 
a civil case between a non-Native American who was doing business 
on the reservation with tribal members who reside on the reservation, 
and that the tribal court would be the proper tribunal.52 The Court noted 
that “absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been 
whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Native 
Americans to make their own laws and be ruled by them,”53 and that 
prior Supreme Court decisions “have consistently guarded the authority 
of Indian governments over their reservations . . . . If this power is to be 
taken from them, it is for Congress to do it.”54 Although the court made 
50  See 132 S. Ct. 2024, 2045, 2054 (2014) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the Kiowa decision, which extended tribal sovereign immunity to bar suits “arising 
out of an Indian tribe’s commercial activities conducted outside its territory,” was an 
“error” and should be overturned. “That decision, wrong to beginning with, has only 
worsened with the passage of time. In the 16 years since Kiowa, tribal commerce 
has proliferated and the inequalities engendered by unwarranted tribal immunity have 
multiplied.” Furthermore, Justice Thomas notes that “[i]n Kiowa, this Court adopted 
a rule without a reason: a sweeping immunity from suit untethered from commercial 
realities and the usual justifications for immunity, premised on the misguided notion 
that only Congress can place sensible limits on a doctrine we created. The decision was 
mistaken then, and the Court’s decision to reaffirm it in the face of the unfairness and 
conflict it has endangered it doubly so.”); 132 S. Ct. 2024, 2054 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (reaffirming her decision to join in Justice Steven’s dissenting opinion in 
Kiowa and stating that “this Court’s declaration of an immunity thus absolute was and 
remains exorbitant.”); 132 S. Ct. 2024, 2045 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I am now 
convinced that Kiowa was wrongly decided; that, in the intervening 16 years, its error 
has grown more glaringly obvious . . . .”).
51  358 U.S. 217 (1959).
52  Id.
53  Id. at 220.
54  Id. at 223 (citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-66 (1903)); see 
Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387 (1976) (stating that state court jurisdiction 
“plainly would interfere with the powers of self-government exercised by the tribe 
through its own tribal courts”).
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it very clear that tribal courts had civil jurisdiction in cases involving 
tribal members, it was not until the 1980’s that the court began to clearly 
address the civil jurisdiction question for suits against non-Native 
Americans.55
It was not until the end of the twentieth century and into the twenty-
first century that the Court addressed cases involving non-Native 
Americans that took place “off-reservation.” In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 
the Court addressed the adjudicatory authority of tribal courts over 
personal injury actions against non-Native Americans, and it held that 
there was no jurisdiction due to the lack of a consensual relationship56 
and the fact that the incident did not occur on tribal lands.57 The general 
rule is that, absent congressional action, tribes lack civil authority over 
the conduct of non-members on non-Indian land within a reservation.58 
Furthermore, in 2001, in Nevada v. Hicks, the Court held that tribal 
55  See Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 417 U.S. 845 (1985) 
(distinguishing civil cases from Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 
(1978), which held that tribal courts didn’t have inherent criminal jurisdiction to 
try and punish non-Native Americans (even if the criminal acts took place on the 
reservation) unless Congress authorized it, and required that each assertion of tribal 
civil jurisdiction should be reviewed, in the first instance, by the tribal court itself, 
and that the parties must exhaust all tribal courts before appealing to the federal 
courts.); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (extending Nat’l Farmers 
to cases involving federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship). However, if 
the reservation is located within one of the six states (Minnesota, Wisconsin, Oregon, 
California, Nevada, and Alaska) that has received congressional authority to assume 
state criminal and civil jurisdiction over tribal members under Public Law 280, 18 
U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, and 25 U.S.C. §§ 1121-1326, and there is consent 
by the tribe, the state law will apply, unless it is “regulatory,” which many consumer 
protection laws are. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm., 411 U.S. 164, 177 
(1973); see also Cal. v. Carbazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
56  See Montana v. United States, 544, 565-66 (1981) (holding that tribes only had 
the power to regulate non-Native American on “Indian land” in two circumstances: 
(1) regulatory authority over “taxation, licensing, or other means, and the activities 
of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, 
through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements”; and (2) when 
the conduct of the non-Native Americans on the reservation “threatens or has some 
direct effect on the political integrity, economic security, or the health or welfare of the 
tribe.”).
57  See 520 U.S. 438, 460 (1997); see also Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family 
Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008) (holding that a tribal court didn’t have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate a discrimination claim concerning the non-Native American 
bank’s sale of fee-land (on a reservation) owned by the bank).
58  Id.
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courts do not have jurisdiction over civil claims against state officials 
who entered tribal land to execute a search warrant against tribal mem-
bers suspected of having violated state law off of the reservation, since 
it was not “essential to tribal self-government or internal relations,” and 
thus not an intrusion on the sovereignty of the Native American tribe.59
II. Current Status of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, Use of 
Arbitration Clauses, Business Concerns, and Recent Litigation 
involving Payday Loans and Native Americans
In the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has decided two 
major cases involving sovereign immunity, arbitration clauses, and 
Native American tribes: Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing 
Technologies, Inc. and C & L Enterprises v. Citizen Band, Potawatomi 
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma.
In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. 
Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. upheld a sovereign immunity defense 
by a Native American tribe for breach of contract involving a busi-
ness located off of the reservation.60 In this case, a tribal entity (the 
Kiowa Industrial Development Commission) agreed to purchase stock 
from Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., and the then-chairman of the 
Kiowa’s business committee signed a promissory note in the name of 
the Tribe to Manufacturing Technologies Inc.61 The note did not specify 
governing law, but was signed on land held in trust for the tribe.62 It was 
delivered outside of tribal land and obligated the Tribe to make pay-
ments in Oklahoma City.63 The note specifically stated that “[n]othing 
in this Note subjects or limits the sovereign rights of the Kiowa Tribe 
. . . ,”64 which clearly was not a waiver of sovereign immunity.65 The 
Tribe defaulted and Manufacturing Technologies sued on the note in 
state court, but the Tribe invoked sovereign immunity.66
59  See 533 U.S. 353, 364 (2001).
60  Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 753.
61  Id.
62  Id. at 754.
63  Id.
64  Id.
65  Robert J. Miller, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN 
COUNTRY 99 (2012) (discussing the implications of Kiowa Tribe’s holding).
66  Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 754.
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When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court held that “an 
Indian tribe is not subject to suit in a state court—even for breach of con-
tract involving off-reservation commercial conduct—unless “Congress 
has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.”67 The Court 
stated that “[a]s a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit 
only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its 
immunity.”68 The Court noted that precedent has not made the distinction 
based on where the tribal activity occurred (on or off the reservation),69 
or a distinction between governmental and commercial activities of the 
tribe.70 Although the Court has recognized that a state may have authority 
to tax or regulate tribal activities occurring within the state but outside 
Indian country,71 “to say substantive state laws apply to off-reservation 
conduct, however, is not to say that a tribe no longer enjoys immunity 
from suit.”72 The Court held that Native American tribes have sovereign 
immunity from civil lawsuits on contracts, regardless if they involved 
governmental or commercial activities, and whether or not they are 
signed in “Indian country.”73 Justices Stevens, Thomas, and Ginsburg 
dissented, arguing since tribal immunity arose by “accident” and was 
unjust,74 it should be limited to on-reservation activities with a “mean-
ingful nexus” to a tribe’s “sovereign function.”75 Although the Court 
noted the doctrine of sovereign immunity for Native American tribes 
67  Id. at 754.
68  Id. at 754; see, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation, 476 U.S. 
at 890; Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58; U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. at 512.
69  See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 167, 168, 172 
(1977) (holding that the Tribe’s claim of immunity was “well founded,” and did not 
discuss the relevance of if the fishing had taken place on or off the reservation).
70  See, e.g., Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 433 U.S. 165 (recognizing tribal immunity for 
fishing, which may well be a commercial activity); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 
506 (recognizing tribal immunity for coal-mining lease).
71  See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973).
72  Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 755.
73  Id. at 753; see also Miller, supra note 64, at 99.
74  Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 761, 766 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75  Id. at 764 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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arose “almost by accident”76 and had been adopted “with little analysis” 
and “without extensive reasoning” in its earlier cases, it still remains the 
law today, and outside investors must “protect themselves” by utilizing 
due diligence in negotiation by demanding immunity waiver clauses.77
Contrary to the “pro-Native American” decision in Kiowa Tribe, in 
2001 the Court held that a tribe had waived its sovereign immunity from 
suit when it “expressly agreed” to arbitrate suits with the contractor, to 
the governance of state law, and to the enforcement of arbitral awards.78 
The case arose after the Citizen Band, Potawatomi Indian Tribe of 
Oklahoma, a federally recognized tribe, solicited and retained a differ-
ent roofing company after deciding to change the roofing material for 
a contract on a building which was owned by the tribe, but not located 
on the reservation, nor was it trust land.79 The initial contractor had the 
tribe sign a standard form contract which contained an arbitration clause 
that provided that disputes would be decided by arbitration, decisions by 
the arbitrator would be final, and judgment would be enforceable; and 
a choice of law clause providing that the contract would be governed 
by the law of the place where the project was located, which would be 
Oklahoma state law, not tribal law.80
The question presented to the Court was “whether the Tribe waived 
its immunity from suit in state court when it expressly agreed to arbi-
trate disputes with C & L relating to the contract, to the governance of 
Oklahoma law, and to the enforcement of arbitral awards ‘in any court 
76  Id. at 756, 763 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concurring with the majority on this point); 
see Wood, supra note 36, at 1593 (discussing the Court’s use, and misunderstanding, 
of Tuner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919), in Kiowa, particular the statement 
describing Turner as “a slender reed for supporting the principle of tribal sovereign 
immunity” since the Turner Court assumed tribal immunity for the sake of argument 
rather than as a “reasoned statement of doctrine.”).
77  Id. at 756, 753, 757; see Wood, supra note 36, at 1589, 1593-94 (arguing that 
the Court misunderstood and mischaracterized the history of sovereign immunity in 
respect to Native American tribes; in particular the Kiowa Court ignored two Eighth 
Circuit cases used in U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, of Adams v. Murphy, 165 F. 
304, 308-09 (8th Cir. 1908) and Thebo, 66 F. 372, and the 1850 Supreme Court case of 
Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. 362, 374 (1850), which applied sovereign immunity principles 
to uphold dismissal of a suit against the Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation.); 
Miller, supra note 64, at 99.
78  C & L Enters., 532 U.S. at 414.
79  Id. at 414-15.
80  Id. at 415.
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having jurisdiction thereof.’”81 The Court first noted that for a tribe to 
relinquish its immunity, its renouncement must be “clear.”82 In this case, 
the waiver—an agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, to be bound 
by the arbitration award, and to have the award enforced in any court of 
law—was unambiguous and explicit.83 The arbitration clause in this case 
had three elements: an agreement to arbitrate all disputes, an agreement 
to be bound by any arbitration award, and an agreement that any award 
could be enforced in any state or federal court with jurisdiction.84 The 
Tribe argued that that since the contract did not specify a specific judi-
cial forum in which to enforce the decision of the arbitrator, sovereign 
immunity was not waived.85 However, the Court rejected this argument, 
holding that the consent to arbitration via the contract, “memorialize[d] 
the Tribe’s commitment to adhere to the contract’s dispute resolution 
regime,” and thus was a waiver of sovereign immunity.86 Therefore, “[a]
ny deviation from this language in C & L Enterprises could engender 
an argument that the case is distinguishable.”87 Furthermore, the “Court 
expressly noted that attempting to hide behind sovereign immunity 
principles under the circumstances equated to a ‘game lacking practi-
cal consequences.’”88 The Court held that “by the clear import of the 
arbitration clause, the Tribe is amenable to a state-court suit to enforce 
an arbitral award in favor of contractor C & L.”89
Prior to the Supreme Court cases, there were numerous state and 
circuit court cases involving arbitration clauses and Native American 
tribes. In Calvello v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, the South Dakota Supreme 
Court held that the tribe’s participation in arbitration did not amount 
81  Id.
82  Id. at 418.
83  Id. at 420.
84  Id. at 415.
85  Id. at 421; see also Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State v. Cnty. of Oneida, 802 
F. Supp. 2d 395, 417 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (distinguishing C & L Enters. from the case 
presented).
86  C & L Enters., 532 U.S. at 422.
87  See Edward Rubacha, Contract Forms and Contract Drafting: Construction 
Contracts with Indian Tribes or on Tribal Lands, CONSTRUCTION L. 12, 13 (2006) 
(discussing the Court’s holding in C & L Enters.).
88  See Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier & Metchi Palaniappan, Intersection of Corporate 
America and Indian Country: Negotiating Successful Business Alliances, 22 T. M. 
COOLEY L. REV. 566, 577 (2005) (discussing the trend by courts to erode sovereign 
immunity for tribes); C & L Enters., 532 U.S. AT 422.
89  C & L Enters., 532 U.S. at 414.
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to a waiver of its sovereign immunity in a contract dispute with one 
of its non-tribal employees.90 Similarly, in Tamiami Partners, Limited 
v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, the Eleventh Circuit upheld 
sovereign immunity to protect the tribe from litigation.91 The Eighth 
Circuit, in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val-U Construction Co., held that the 
tribe expressly waived its sovereign immunity with respect to an arbitra-
tion provision in a construction contract.92 Furthermore, in Val/Del. Inc. 
v. Pascua Yaqui Tribe, an Arizona Appellate Court held that an arbitra-
tion provision, in a contract with a management company to finance and 
operate the Tribe’s bingo operation, constituted a clear indication that 
sovereign immunity had been waived, thus jurisdiction was concurrent 
in the state court and in the tribal court.93
For an arbitration clause to be enforceable, the tribe must have 
relinquished its sovereign immunity by executing a waiver.94 A waiver 
of sovereign immunity “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally 
expressed,”95 but the use of talismanic words, such as “sovereign immu-
nity,” is not needed for a waiver to be valid.96 Courts, in determining 
whether a tribe has relinquished its protection with sufficient clarity, 
have inquired “whether the language of [the operative agreement or 
clause] might have hoodwinked an unsophisticated Indian negotiator 
into giving up the tribe’s immunity from suit without realizing that he 
was doing so.”97 To determine whether an agreement is sufficiently 
90  See 584 N.W.2d 108 (S.D. 1998); see also Heath Oberloch, Calvello v. Yankton 
Sioux Tribe: Shoring Up Tribal Sovereign Immunity Against the Flood of Commercial 
Transactions Involving Tribally Owned Businesses, 44 S.D. L. REV. 746, 746 (1999) 
(examining the holding of Calvello).
91  177 F.3d 1212, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 1999); see also David D. Haddock & Robert 
J. Miller, Sovereignty Can be a Liability: How Tribes Can Mitigate the Sovereign’s 
Paradox, in SELF-DETERMINATION: THE OTHER PATH FOR NATIVE AMERICANS 194, 205-06 
(Terry L. Anderson, Bruce L. Benson, & Thomas E. Flanagan, eds., 2006).
92  Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val-U Const. Co., 50 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 1995).
93  145 Ariz. 558, 565 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
94  Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 754.
95  Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 458.
96  C & L Enters., 532 U.S. at 420; see also Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 50 F.3d at 563 (“[W]
hile the Supreme Court has expressed its protectiveness of tribal sovereign immunity 
by requiring that any waiver be explicit, it has never required the invocation of magic 
words stating that the tribe hereby waives its sovereign immunity.”).
97  Sokaogon Gaming Enter. Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery Assocs., Inc., 86 F.3d 
656, 660 (7th Cir. 1996); see Rubacha, supra note 86, at 12 (discussing the issue in 
determining if a tribe has relinquished its sovereign immunity protection).
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“clear” requires courts to take “a practical, commonsense approach in 
attempting to separate words that fairly can be construed as compromis-
ing a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity from words that fall short.”98 
Basically, “the cases require that waiver be found when expressed in a 
way that could not unfairly surprise a tribe.”99 Therefore, for a tribe to be 
subject to mandatory arbitration clauses, the waiver of sovereign immu-
nity must be so obvious that the tribe could not be surprised. However, 
unlike the waiver of sovereign immunity, a tribe, as a commercial entity, 
does not have to make the mandatory arbitration clause obvious to the 
public.
a. Use of Arbitration Clauses and Forum-Selection  
Clauses Today
Arbitration clauses are standard within American consumer agree-
ments: from cell phones, to credit cards, to mortgages, all include, in 
the small print, the waiver of the right to litigation and the agreement 
to mandatory and binding arbitration.100 The percentage of arbitration 
clause in consumer product contracts appears to be increasing, with one 
study finding that 76.9% of consumer contracts studied included arbi-
tration clauses, and “every consumer contract with an arbitration clause 
98  Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuch Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 
31 (1st Cir. 2000).
99  Rubacha, supra note 86, at 12.
100  See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller, & Emily Sherwin, Arbitrations’ 
Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and 
Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 871 (2007-2008) (discussing the 
rise in arbitration clauses in consumer contracts); see, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (permitting contracts that exclude class action 
arbitration in a cell phone contract), Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 
S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (holding that class action waivers in arbitration agreements (for 
credit cards) will be strictly enforced under the Federal Arbitration Act, even when 
it is not economically feasible for individual plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims); see 
also Nitro-Lift Tech., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012) (reversing Oklahoma’s 
Supreme Court decision that prevented arbitration of a dispute over a non-competition 
agreement in employment contracts), Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 131 S. 
Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that West Virginia’s categorical prohibition of pre-dispute 
agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful death claims against nursing 
homes is contrary to the terms and coverage of the Federal Arbitration Act).
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also included a waiver of class-wide arbitration.”101 In the past few years 
there has been an increase in media attention and criticism regarding 
mandatory arbitration clauses, in particular those which are related 
to financial services products, and it is very likely that the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau will begin to crack down on arbitration 
clauses.102 As with many things, there are both positive aspects and criti-
cisms regarding the use of arbitration clauses. On a positive note, they 
allow companies to save money while reducing the cost of products 
to consumers due to the decrease likelihood of litigation.103 However, 
there are far more criticisms regarding the use of mandatory arbitration 
clauses, including the unfairness imposed by economically powerful 
corporations on the unsophisticated consumers who must unwillingly 
consent, the deprivation of jury trials, and the lower damage awards, 
even though this has not been proven.104 Critics also argue that man-
datory arbitration is detrimental to the public interest, which supports 
101  See Eisenberg et al., supra note 99, at 883 table 2, 881, 884 (sample consisted of 
twenty-six consumer agreements drafted by twenty-one companies, including three 
commercial banks (five consumer agreements), two credit card issuers (two consumer 
agreements), and one financial credit company (one consumer agreement)); see 
also Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through 
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 64 (2004) (this study found that 69.2% of the consumer financial 
contracts in their sample included arbitration clauses and included tax preparation and 
investment contracts, in addition to credit card and banking contracts, as consumer 
financial contracts, and if limited to credit card and banking contracts, twelve of 
seventeen, or 70.6%, included arbitration clauses).
102  See Rachel Witkowski, CFPB Likely to Crack Down on Arbitration Clauses, 
AMERICAN BANKER (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_237/
cfpb-likely-to-crack-down-on-arbitration-clauses-1064229-1.html.
103  Eisenberg et al., supra note 99, at 872; see Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price 
of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 89, 90 (2001) (noting a variety of ways in which arbitration reduces the cost 
of dispute resolution for companies, including: (1) high damages are less likely due 
to the lack of juries, (2) defendant companies avoid bad publicity, (3) procedures are 
nationally uniform, (4) the finality of arbitration saves companies the potential cost of 
appeal, (5) eliminates the possibility of class action, (6) deters claims against business 
by requiring consumer-plaintiffs to pay arbitrator fees, as well as filing fees that exceed 
the filing fees in litigation, and (7) discovery and appeals are limited).
104  Eisenberg et al., supra note 99, at 872-83; see Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth 
Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 
58 DISP. RESOL. J. 44 (Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004) (determining that there is no significant 
difference between arbitration and litigation awards).
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transparency in legal resolutions, and that the prohibition on class 
actions which are put forward by many contracts preventing the neces-
sary appraisal by consumers of corporate malfeasance, make litigating 
small claims economically viable, and to hold companies accountable 
for wrongdoing.105
Most recently, there has been an increase in criticism and concern 
regarding mandatory arbitration clauses in financial services contracts 
with Native Americans and non-Native Americans. On December 12, 
2013, the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)106 released 
the preliminary results of the much-anticipated study of pre-dispute 
arbitration contract provisions in financial products/services.107 Not 
surprisingly, the CFPB’s study of the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA) filings about credit cards, checking accounts, payday loans, and 
prepaid cards between 2010 and 2012 found less than 1,250 consumer 
arbitrations (most concerned with debt collection). Approximately 900 
consumer arbitrations were filed by consumers, compared to over 3,000 
cases involving credit card issues alone filed in federal court, with more 
than 400 filed as class action.108
Although the CFPB study examined credit cards, checking accounts, 
payday loans, and prepaid cards, the recent litigation concerning Native 
Americans involves only payday lending. Payday lending is rampant in 
the United States, with two million households, and up to twelve million 
105  Eisenberg et al., supra note 99, at 874.
106  See About Us, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.
consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (The CFPB is an independent federal agency, 
created in 2011 under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, which is responsible for regulating consumer protection for financial services and 
products in the United States.).
107  See Arbitration Study Preliminary Results: Section 1028(a) Study Results to Date, 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Dec. 12, 2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.
gov/f/201312_cfpb_arbitration-study-preliminary-results.pdf.
108  Id.; see CFPB Finds Few Consumer File Arbitration Cases, Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/the-cfpb-finds-
few-consumers-file-arbitration-cases/ (Indicating large banks prefer arbitration clauses 
over class actions.).
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individuals in 2010 using them annually.109 An average of eight loans 
in the amount of $375 are taken annually, resulting in a $520 interest 
payment.110 It is important to remember that legitimate short-term con-
sumer loans, such as payday loans, are the most attractive credit option 
for the unbanked and underbanked.111 The CFPB study determined that, 
unlike for credit cards, there was an annual average of forty-six payday 
loan arbitration filings, with forty-four filed by consumers, and only one 
involving debt collection.112 Most of the arbitration claims invoked state 
statutory claims (90%), contract claims (83%), fraud claims (75%), and 
tort claims (61%), but also included federal statutory claims (28%), 
Credit Repair Organization Act113 (14%), Truth in Lending Act114 (7%), 
109  See Addendum to the 2011 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked 
Households Use of Alternative Financial Services, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. 48 
(2013) available at http://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2013_AFSAddendum_
web.pdf; see also Who Borrows, Where They Borrow, and Why: Payday Lending in 
America, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 4 (2012), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/
uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Safe_Small_Dollar_Loans/LOANS_
Payday%20Lending%20Report%20Final_web.pdf (finding that 5.5% of adults in the 
United States have used a payday loan in the past five years, with three-quarters using 
storefront lenders and approximately one-quarter using the internet)
110  See Who Borrows, Where They Borrow, and Why, supra note 108, at 4.
111  See Robert Rosette & Saba Bazzazieh, Arizona’s Win-Win Short-Term Credit 
Solution: Assisting Arizona’s Unbanked and Underbanked While Supporting Tribal 
Self-Determination, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 781, 784 (2013).
112  See Arbitration Study Preliminary Results, supra note 106, at 12, 13 n. 25.
113  15 U.S.C. § 1679 et seq. (2011). The Credit Repair Organizations Act (“CROA”), 
which is part of Title IV of the Consumer Protection Act, was enacted to “ensure that 
prospective buyers of the services of credit repair organizations are provided with the 
information necessary to make an informed decision regarding the purchase of such 
services” and to “protect the public from unfair or deceptive advertising and business 
practices by credit repair organizations.” Id. at § 1679(b).
114  15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (2011). The Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), which 
was enacted on May 29, 1968, was created to promote informed use of consumer 
credit, in particular, by requiring disclosures about its terms and costs to standardize 
the manner in which costs associated with borrowing are calculated and disclosed. 
See generally CFPB Consumer Laws and Regulations: Truth in Lending, CONSUMER 
FINANCE PROTECTION BUREAU (June 2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.
gov/f/201306_cfpb_laws-and-regulations_tila-combined-june-2013.pdf.
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refutation of alleged debt (7%), and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act115 
(6%).116 Furthermore, the study found that nine out of ten arbitration 
clauses expressly bar consumers from filing class arbitration, consum-
ers prefer arbitration over class action settlements, arbitrations are not 
filed by consumers for small-dollar disputes, and few consumers file 
small claims court actions.117
Like many business contracts today, Native American tribes and 
tribal entities118 utilize mandatory arbitration contracts within the con-
tracts they write, and sometimes must waive sovereign immunity and 
are subject to arbitration. However, unlike the federal government and 
states, most tribes do not waive sovereign immunity in such a sweep-
ing nature.119 Despite financial pressure, most tribes have chosen not to 
waive their sovereign immunity in commercial dealings.120 One reason 
for this is the existence of informational imbalances between tribes 
and their business partners.If a business partner is unaware that a tribe 
or a commercial entity established by a tribe has immunity, then the 
115  15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2011). The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, which was 
approved in September 1977, established the legal protection from abuse debt collection 
practices and its purpose is to: (1) eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt 
collectors, (2) to ensure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt 
collection practices are not completely disadvantaged, and (3) to promote consistent 
State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses. Id. at § 1692(e).
116  See Arbitration Study Preliminary Results, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
supra note 106, at 87 figure 21.
117  See CFPB Finds Few Consumer File Arbitration Cases, Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, supra note 107.
118  Sovereign immunity extends to the activities of tribal entities since they are the 
“economic arms” of the tribe itself and thus should be entitle to the same protections. 
See Staudenmaier & Palaniappan, supra note 87, at 574-55; see also Weeks Constr., 
Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668, 670-71 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that, as 
an arm of the tribal government, the tribal housing authority is extended the “attributed 
of tribal sovereignty” [citing Dubrary v. Rosebud Hous. Auth., 565 F. Supp. 462, 465-
66 (D.S.D. 1983)], therefore, “suits against an agency . . . [are] barred absent a waiver 
of sovereign immunity” [citing Wilson v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 
459 F. Supp. 366, 368-69 (D.N.D. 1978]); Gayle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284, 
287 (Min. 1996) (extending tribal sovereign immunity to tribal casinos); Sanchez v. 
Santa Ana Golf Club, Inc., 104 P.3d 548, 554 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (extending tribal 
immunity to a tribally-owned golf course); DeFeo v. Ski Apache Resort, 904 P.2d 1065, 
1069 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (applying tribal immunity to ski resort owned by tribe).
119  See Hogan, supra note 29, at 576 (discussing the difference between tribal and 
state sovereign immunity); see also Miller, supra note 64, at 97.
120  Lake, supra note 22, at 101.
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tribe can negotiate without informing the other party of the immunity 
and retain the benefit of the immunity without sacrificing anything in 
negotiations.121 However, if tribes waive their immunity, and thus are 
subjected to arbitration, they do so on a case-by-case basis in contract 
provisions.122
b. How Tribes/Tribal Courts Address Disputes, Awards & the 
Appeals Process for Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
In the past century, Native American tribal courts have grown expo-
nentially in number. Approximately 250 of the 563 federally recognized 
tribes in the United States have a tribal court system.123 Unfortunately, 
these tribal courts vary in their complexity and workload. For example, 
the Navajo Nation’s judicial system decides thousands of cases a year 
compared to other tribes with only part-time judges who hear only a 
few cases a year.124 Furthermore, the different use of customary and 
“American” law in these courts, in addition to the lack of separation 
of powers,125 can make these tribal courts very difficult for outsiders to 
understand both in procedure and in language used. Contrary to popu-
lar belief, tribal courts have been found to be quite fair to non-Native 
Americans.126
Like American courts, many tribal courts have created their own 
judicial system with extensive rules and procedures, such as the 
121  Hogan, supra note 29, at 576; Lake, supra note 22, at 101-02 (arguing that tribes 
have not waived their immunity in order to maintain information imbalances when 
negotiating).
122  See Miller, supra note 64, at 97.
123  Id. at 106; see also Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, 
Choctaw Tribal Court System, TRIBAL GOVERNANCE SUCCESS STORIES: HONORING NATIONS 
2005 (2006), http://hpaied.org/images/resources/publibrary/Choctaw%20Tribal%20
Court%20System.pdf (discussing the success of the Choctaw tribal court system).
124  See Miller, supra note 64, at 106.
125  See generally Stephen Cornell, Sovereignty, Prosperity and Policy in Indian 
Country Today, 5 CMTY. REINVESTMENT 5, 5-7, 9-13 (1997)
126  See Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty 
Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM INDIAN L. REV. 285, 285-87, 351-52 (1998) (finding that, 
after analyzing 85 cases in tribal courts, there is fairness towards non-Native American 
litigants).
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Mashantucket Pequot Tribe and the Navajo Nation.127 One major dif-
ference between tribal courts and the traditional American court is 
the variety of qualifications required to be a judge; unlike American 
courts, some tribal courts do not require law degrees while others do.128 
Additionally, tribal laws, unlike American laws, may include traditional 
practices that are through oral history, and are not codified.129 However, 
similar to American courts, tribal courts follow procedural rules which 
outline the adjudicatory authority and limitations of tribal jurisdiction.130 
Furthermore, most tribal courts do follow precedent, sometimes from 
other tribal courts, and frequently view federal and state court decisions 
as persuasive authority, particularly in commercial litigation.131
Due to the independence of each tribe, it is difficult to generalize how 
tribes address disputes, awards, and the appeals process.132 However, if 
tribal law governs, which many of the new arbitration clauses state (and 
are currently subject to litigation), prior to court proceedings, or engag-
ing in dispute resolution, it is vital to undertake sufficient due diligence 
in understanding the process and structure of the tribal courts. This is 
usually done by reviewing the tribe’s constitution or other governance 
documents, the tribal entity’s organizational or other governance docu-
ments, applicable tribal council resolutions, and other applicable and 
relevant tribal laws, codes, and regulations.133 This is similar to the due 
diligence that any attorney should conduct when working in a new juris-
diction. Overall, the individual nature of tribal courts makes it nearly 
127  See Staudenmaier & Palaniappan, supra note 87, at 590; see also Mashantucket 
Pequot Tribal Laws (2008), available at HTTP://WWW.MPTNLAW.COM/LAWS/TITLES%20
24%20-%20END.PDF and 7 NAVAJO NATION CODE TIT. 7 (1977) (EXPLAINING DIFFERENT 
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS).
128  See Staudenmaier & Palaniappan, supra note 87, at 591; see Gordon K. Wright, 
Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1397, 1401-02 
(1985).
129  See Staudenmaier & Palaniappan, supra note 87, at 591.
130  Id.
131  Id. at 591-92; see Mamiye v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 1 Mash. 245, 
247-49 (1996) (citing federal and Connecticut cases as persuasive authority). Most 
state courts extend full faith and credit to tribal court orders, as do federal courts, who 
generally grant comity to tribal judges’ rulings. See Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 
944 F.2d 548, 555 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting the use of precedent by tribal courts).
132  See Staudenmaier & Palaniappan, supra note 87, at 592 (discussing the unique 
nature of each tribes judicial and enforcement procedures).
133  Id.
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impossible to generalize, but a case-by-case analysis of each tribe is 
possible and highly suggested prior to entering the tribal court.
c. Business Concerns
Native American businesses have untapped potential for economic 
growth with the Native American gaming industry making over $26.2 
billion in gross revenue in 2009 alone, along with $3.2 billion in related 
hospitality and entertainment services.134 Native American gaming 
is the most publicly seen aspect of tribal economic development, but 
due to the fact that many reservations are not located near metropoli-
tan areas or otherwise unable to participate in gaming, many tribes 
have been forced to diversity their economic development, most often 
through the internet.135 Native American tribes have moved into offer-
ing legitimate short-term consumer loans through tribally-regulated 
and tribally-owned online short-term lending companies.136 There are 
numerous business concerns regarding the use of mandatory arbitration 
clauses, forum-selection clauses, and waivers of sovereign immunity, 
when doing business with Native American tribes today. However, the 
most prevalent concern, which must be settled prior to arbitration agree-
ments, is the sovereign immunity of tribes and tribal entities.
As discussed above, tribes enjoy sovereign immunity from suit. 
Tribal sovereign immunity exists for two reasons: the need to protect 
the economic viability of the tribes, and to recognize their status as 
separate sovereigns.137 However, there is an argument for eliminating 
tribal immunity in that “immunity can actually harm tribal economies 
if commercial partners are reluctant to deal with Indian entities whose 
134  See NAT’L INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INDIAN GAMING IN 2009 
(2010), http://www.indiangaming.org/info/NIGA_2009_Economic_Impact_Report.
pdf (stating that the 237 Native American tribes, in 28 states, that are involved in the 
gaming industry, provided $9.4 billion in federal taxes and revenue savings, in addition 
to $2.4 billion in state taxes, revenue sharing, and regulatory payments). See also R. 
Lance Boldrey & Jason Hanselman, Proceed with Prudence: Advising Clients Doing 
Business in Indian Country, MICH. BAR. J. 34, 24 (Feb. 2010) (noting that with the 
twelve federally recognized Native American tribes in Michigan there was an expected 
$1.5 billion in revenue in 2010 alone).
135  See Rosette & Bazzazieh, supra note 110, at 800 (establishing the growth of the 
tribal gaming industry).
136  Id. at 784.
137  Hogan, supra note 29, at 572 (explaining that many tribes depend on Indian 
gaming revenues).
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status under the immunity doctrine may be unclear.”138 Furthermore, the 
“primary threat immunity poses to tribal enterprises is the uncertainty 
it creates between these enterprises and their business partners, particu-
larly lenders.”139 This is due to the fact that if a court determines that 
tribal sovereign immunity applies, then lenders cannot revert to their 
typical means of recourse against defaulting borrows, i.e., creditors 
cannot enforce judgments in their favor because courts have no author-
ity to order the seizure of assets on tribal land for a creditor’s sale.140
Obstacles between business partners and tribes harm the economic 
prospects of the tribe since as transaction costs increase, immunity-
related obstacles cause businesses to negotiate with and treat tribes 
differently than other entities,141 and many potential business partners 
are reluctant to deal with Native American tribes at all.142 There have 
been numerous “horror stories” about tribes hiding behind sovereign 
immunity in business disputes, including that of C & L Enterprises.143 
Although these horror stories do exist, there are many examples of 
successful business negotiations and partnerships between Native 
American tribes and non-Native Americans.144 It is important to remem-
ber that tribes are not free from regulation when they conduct economic 
138  Id. at 574.
139  Id. at 575.
140  Id.; Rubacha, supra note 86, at 16.
141  See David B. Jordan, Federal Indian Law: Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Why 
Oklahoma Businesses Should Revamp Legal Relationships with Indian Tribes After 
Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 52 OKLA. L. REV. 489, 504 (1999) 
(arguing that immunity has hindered the economic interests of tribes and that immunity 
results in resentment and missed opportunities for tribes).
142  See Hogan, supra note 29, at 575-76 (discussing the obstacles faced by business 
partners and tribes).
143  See C & L Enter., 532 U.S. 411.
144  See Miller, supra note 64, at 98 (noting that, as of 2002, the Confederated Tribes 
of the Siletz Indian Reservation in Oregon had approximate 275 contracts with various 
business entities, and only 35 of them required waivers of sovereign immunity).
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activities off of the reservation.145 Additionally, even when tribal sov-
ereign immunity is found to apply to a tribal entity, “tribal sovereign 
is not absolute autonomy,” and tribes are not permitted “to operate in a 
commercial capacity without legal constraints.”146
It is vital, both to the ability of tribes to conduct business and for 
the protection of business interests by non-Native Americans, that 
both parties conduct due diligence and carefully protect themselves by 
obtaining adequate waivers of tribal sovereign immunity.147 Absent a 
consensual waiver by the tribe, the only other way to obtain a waiver of 
sovereign immunity is through Congress since the sovereignty of Native 
American tribes “exists only at the sufferance of Congress,” which has 
145  See Mescalero Apache Tribe, supra note 70, at 148-49 (noting that “[a]bsent 
express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have 
generally been held subject to non-discriminatory state law otherwise applicable to 
all citizens of the State.”); see, e.g., Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game of Wash, 391 
U.S. 392, 398 (1968) (holding that a treaty provision did not preclude the state from 
regulating the manner of fishing and restricting commercial fishing in the interest of 
conservation as long as the regulation was reasonable and a necessary exercise of the 
state’s police power and did not discriminate against the Native Americans); Org. Vill. 
of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1962) (holding that the state has the power to 
regulate off-reservation fishing by Native Americans); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 
681, 683 (1942) (holding that a state statute prescribing licensing fees for fishing is 
invalid as applied to a Native American convicted of fishing without a license since the 
treaty secured the exclusive right to take all fish in the water boarding the reservation); 
Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U.S. 575 (1928) (holding that the Secretary 
of the Interior did not have the power, when the land was purchased for a Native 
American with trust funds, to exempt it from state taxation); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 
U.S. 504 (1896) (holding that a state had a right to regulate hunting off-reservation).
146  See, e.g., San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1314-15 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (upholding the NLRB’s decision that National Labor Relations Act 
applied to a Native American casino and that federal Indian law did not preclude this 
since the operation of a casino is not a traditional attribute of self-government and 
most of the employees and customers were not tribal members, nor did they live on the 
reservation).
147  Miller, supra note 64, at 98.
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the power to modify or limit a tribes’ authority.148 “All aspects of Indian 
sovereignty are subject to defeasance by Congress,”149 thus, Congress 
has the power to waive tribes’ sovereign immunity rights. It is also very 
important for outside businesses to include a clear forum selection 
clause with an obvious forum selected.150 However, if there is a properly 
constructed waiver of sovereign immunity and the arbitration clause is 
fair to both parties, there is nothing for outside business to be concerned 
about.
d. Recent Litigation Involving Payday Lending and Native 
American Tribes
Recently there has been an increase of cases and enforcement 
actions against tribes regarding payday lending. In State of Colorado v. 
Cash Advance, the Colorado Supreme Court held that: (i) tribal immu-
nity applies to administrative subpoenas directed at tribal commercial 
activities conducted off of tribal lands; (ii) such immunity depends on 
whether the entity is an “arm of the tribe”; (iii) officers of tribal enti-
ties are immune for acts within the scope of the their tribal authority; 
and (iv) the state has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
148  See Staudenmaier & Palaniappan, supra note 87, at 578 (discussing congressional 
waivers in regards to tribal sovereign immunity); United States v. Wheeler, 435 
U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (holding that Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th Amendment 
did not bar the prosecution of a Native American in federal district court under the 
Major Crimes Act, when he had previously been convicted in a tribal court of a lesser 
included offense, since the power of a tribal court to punish a tribal offender is part 
of the inherent tribal sovereignty, and not part of the federal government); see John F. 
Petoskey, Doing Business with Michigan Indian Tribes, 76 Mich. B.J. 440, 442 (1997).
149  Escondidio Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 
788 n.30 (1984).
150  See Boldrey & Hanselman, supra note 133, at 35.
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evidence that the tribal entities are not immune.151 Then in Missouri 
v. Webb, the Missouri Attorney General brought suit against Payday 
Financial, LLC, Western Sky Financial, LLC, and others in state court, 
claiming that their Internet-based lending businesses violated Missouri 
law.152 On March 27, 2012, after the defendants removed the case to 
federal court, the district court remanded the case back to state court.153 
The district court held that (1) sovereign immunity assertions do not 
create a federal question for jurisdiction purposes; (2) forum selection 
clauses provide no basis for federal jurisdiction; and (3) the individual 
defendant’s tribal membership did not confer sovereign immunity on 
him or on the defendant South Dakota LLC.154 Finally, in Maryland 
Commissioner of Financial Regulation v. Western Sky Financial LLC, 
the court held that it should abstain from interfering in Maryland’s 
enforcement of its lending laws and rejected a dismissal request by the 
payday lending company.155
In August of 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit reversed and remanded the class action suit of Jackson v. Payday 
151  Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. State ex rel. Suthers, 242 P.3d 1099, 
1102 (Colo. 2010). Previously, the court of appeals adopted an 11-part common law 
test to determine when tribal business entities are considered arms of the tribe.” This 
includes: (1) whether the entity is organized under the Tribes’ laws or constitutions; (2) 
whether the purposes of the entity is similar to the Tribes’ purposes; (3) whether the 
governing bodies the entity is composed predominantly of tribal officials; (4) whether 
the Tribes have legal title to or own the property used by the entity; (5) whether tribal 
officials exercise control over the entity’s administration and accounting; (6) whether 
the Tribes’ governing bodies have the authority to dismiss members of the governing 
bodies of the entity; (7) whether the entity generate their own revenues; (8) whether 
a suit against the entity will affect the Tribes’ finances and bind or obligate tribal 
funds; (9) the announced purposes of the entity; (10) whether the entity manage or 
exploit tribal resources; and (11) whether protection of tribal assets and autonomy 
will be furthered by extending immunity to the entity. Colorado ex rel. Suthers v. Cash 
Advance & Preferred Cash Loans, 205 P.3d 389, 406 (Colo. App. 2008).
152  Missouri v. Webb, No. 11SL-CC01680 (St. Louis Cnty. Cir. Ct. Apr. 25, 2011); 
http://www.narf.org/nill/bulletins/dct/documents/missouri_v_webb.html.
153  Missouri v. Webb, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41702 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 27, 2012).
154  Id. at *10-*11; see Puyallup Tribe, 433 U.S. at 171-72 (noting that the “doctrine 
of sovereign immunity . . . does not immunize individual members of [a] Tribe.”).
155  Md. Comm’r of Fin. Regulation v. W. Sky Fin., LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
117665, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 12, 2011); W. Sky Fin., LLC v. Md. Comm’r of Fin. 
Regulation, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107016, at 17 (D. Md. July 27, 2012).
2014 The Current State Of Arbitration Clauses Within Native American Tribal Contracts: 171
 An Examination Of Binding Arbitration Contracts in Native American Payday Lending
Financial, LLC.156 The case involves a forum-selection clause requiring 
borrowers to submit to arbitration at a Native American reservation,157 
which the plaintiffs contend cannot legitimately adjudicate such suits 
or issue valid judgments.158 The lower court upheld the forum selection 
clause, but the plaintiffs appealed and gained support from the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) who recently settled an enforcement action 
against Payday Financial,159 and filed an amicus brief in support of the 
plaintiffs on September 26, 2013.160 This is a fascinating case because it 
156  Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, No. 12-2617, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16257 (7th 
Cir., Aug. 22, 2014).
157  Id.
158  Brief for the FTC as amicus curiae, Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 94095 (2012) (No. 11-09288), 4, available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-files-amicus-brief-supporting-class-action-suit-
challenges-payday-lenders-arbitration-practices/130913paydayfinancialbrief.pdf.
159  See FTC v. Payday Fin., LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141891 (D.S.D. Sept. 30, 
2013) (granting in part and denying in part plaintiff ’s (FTC) motion for summary 
judgment). Regarding the allegedly unfair practice of bringing suit in tribal court, the 
district court stated that it was “skeptical” that a South Dakota limited liability company 
merely licensed with the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe become tribal members and 
“thereby can invoke tribal court jurisdiction over the consumers under the language of 
the consumer loan agreements,” but was not prepared to rule, so stated it will consider 
further testimony on whether Payday Financial constitute a common enterprise 
and whether Webb is personally liable for the violations by Payday Financial. Id. at 
*44. Previously, the district court had denied the FTC’s motion for partial summary 
judgment regarding the unfair practice to bring suit in the tribal jurisdiction. FTC v. 
Payday Fin., LLC, 935 F. Supp. 2d 926, 926 (D.S.D. Mar. 28, 2013). In that opinion, 
the court addressed the “thorny question of tribal court jurisdiction” over borrowers by 
using typical language of Payday Financials loan agreements, but denied the motion 
holding that the “record lacks information establishing that the Defendants are in fact 
‘members’ of the tribe for purposes of the first Montana [450 U.S. at 565] exceptions;” 
and “an ambiguity in the contract exists as to under what circumstances the non-Indian 
is consenting to tribal court jurisdiction in addition to binding arbitration.” See FTC, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141891 at 40. But see J.L. Ward Assocs., Inc. v. Great Palins 
Tribal Chairmen’s Health Bd., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1171-77 (D.S.D. 2012) (evaluating 
circumstances where an entity created under state law, rather than incorporated under 
tribal law, by various tribes to represent the tribe possesses tribal sovereign immunity). 
Id.
160 See FTC Files Amicus Brief Supporting Class Action Suit that Challenges Payday 
Lender’s Arbitration Practices, Fed. Trade Comm.’n (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.
ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/09/ftc-files-amicus-brief-supporting-class-
action-suit-challenges.
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combines two “hot topics” in law: payday lending regulation and arbi-
tration clauses.
The appeal addressed the question of whether, pursuant to an arbi-
tration provision in the loan contract, the defendants can require borrow-
ers’ claims against them be resolved by arbitration on the Reservation 
conducted by representatives of the Tribe.161 The court determined 
that the lower court wrongly dismissed the case and that the arbitral 
mechanism specified in the agreement was “illusory.”162 Interestingly, 
Payday Financial, which is one of the many entities owned by Martin A. 
Webb,163 claimed tribal immunity, but is incorporated in South Dakota.164 
In addition, only its operator, Webb, is a member of the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Tribe.165 The entity has not lent, nor targeted, tribal members or 
residents of South Dakota, but claim Montana’s exemption applies.166 
Under Montana v. United States, a tribe only has the power to regu-
late non-Native Americans on “Indian land” in two circumstances: (1) 
regulatory authority over “taxation, licensing, or other means, and the 
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the 
tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, 
or other arrangements”; and (2) when the conduct of the non-Native 
Americans on the reservation “threatens or has some direct effect on 
the political integrity, economic security, or the health or welfare of the 
tribe.”167 However, under the loan documents, the agreement is “sub-
ject solely to the exclusive laws and jurisdiction of the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Tribe, Cheyenne River Indian Reservation,” and contains a clause 
161  2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16257, *6; see also Brief for the FTC as amicus curiae, 
Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, at 5.
162  Id. at *13. Webb also owns Western Sky Financial, LLC. Id.
163  2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16527, *1.
164  Id. at *13. Webb also owns Western Sky Financial, LLC. Id.
165  Id at 8. Interestingly, one of Mr. Webb’s other entities, Western Sky Financial 
LLC, states on its website, as a disclaimer on the main page, that “WESTERN SKY 
FINANCIAL is owned wholly by an individual Tribal Member of the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Tribe and is not owned or operated by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe or any of 
its political subdivisions. WESTERN SKY FINANCIAL is a Native American business 
operating within the exterior boundaries of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation, 
a sovereign nation located within the United States of America.” See WESTERN SKY 
FINANCIAL, http://www.westernsky.com/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2013). 
166  See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (a tribe has the authority to regulate “the activities 
of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, 
through commercial dealings [or] contracts”).
167  Id. at 565-66.
2014 The Current State Of Arbitration Clauses Within Native American Tribal Contracts: 173
 An Examination Of Binding Arbitration Contracts in Native American Payday Lending
stating “no other state or federal law or regulation shall apply to this 
. . . [a]greement, its enforcement or interpretation.”168 The arbitration 
clause in this contract mandates the forum is the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribe Nation.169 The arbitrators are, by the plaintiff ’s choice, “either (i) a 
Tribal Elder, or (ii) a panel of three (3) members of the Tribal Counsel”; 
and the arbitration “shall be conducted in accordance with the Cheyenne 
River Sioux Tribal Nation’s consumer dispute rules and the terms of this 
Agreement.”170
On May 22, 2013, the Seventh Circuit issued a “limited” remand to 
the district court, requesting a finding of fact on whether (1) applicable 
tribal law is readily available to the public and, if so, under what condi-
tions; and (2) the arbitrator and method of arbitration required under the 
parties’ contracts are actually available.171 In August, the district court 
responded in the affirmative to the first question, finding that the law of 
the tribe “can be acquired by reasonable means,” even though the plain-
tiffs were only able to secure a copy after numerous failed attempts and at 
a greater cost than the defendants.172 However, regarding the availability 
of tribal arbitration, the court answered with “a resounding no.”173 Based 
on the New Hampshire Banking Department’s investigation, the court 
concluded there was no “methodized” tribal arbitration process and the 
defendants “promise of a meaningful and fairly conducted arbitration 
168  2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16527, *5.
169  Id. at 9.
170  Id. at *23; Opening Brief of Appellants Jackson at 6, Jackson v. Payday Fin., 
LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94095 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2012), appeal docketed, No. 
12-2617 (7th Cir., Sept. 21, 2012). The agreement also stated that “YOU HEREBY 
AGREE THAT YOU ARE WAIVING YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL, TO HAVE 
A COURT DECIDE YOUR DISPUTE, TO PARTICIPATE IN A CLASS ACTION 
LAWSUIT, AND TO HAVE CERTAIN DISCOVERY AND OTHER PROCEDURES 
THAT ARE AVAILABLE IN A LAWSUIT . . . . [The] parties agree that the arbitrator 
has no authority to conduct class-wide proceedings . . . . The validity, effect and 
enforceability of this waiver of class action lawsuit and class-wide Arbitration is to be 
determined solely by a court of competent jurisdiction located within the Cheyenne 
[River] Sioux Tribal Nation, and not by the arbitrator . . . . ” Id.
171  Order, Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, No. 12-2617 (7th Cir. May 22, 2013), 1-2.
172  District Court’s Response to Court of Appeals Remand for Finding of Fact at 2; 
Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, (No. 11-09288). (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2013), 2.
173  Id. at 6.
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is a sham and an illusion.”174 Recently, the Seventh Circuit determined 
that the district court should not have dismissed the plaintiff ’s actions 
since the “mechanism specified in the agreement is illusory,” and dis-
missed the argument that the loan documents require any litigation to 
be conducted under tribal law, not federal law, thus “exhaustion in tribal 
courts is not required.”175 This case should serve as a strong warning 
for those private, non-tribal entities, who engage in payday lending 
off-reservation, but claim tribal immunity and tribal forum selection, 
to adhere to federal regulatory laws and not hide behind the legitimate 
shield of tribal sovereign immunity.
Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit has an appeal pending in Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc.176 Unlike 
Jackson v. Payday Financial, the lower court found the arbitration agree-
ment to be void.177 This case also involves Western Sky Financial, LLC, 
and Webb. The plaintiff, Inetianbor, was loaned $2,525, with an annual 
interest rate of 135%, by Western Sky Financial, but CashCall, Inc. was 
the servicer, handler, and collector of the loan.178 Inetianbor claimed 
that he had paid the loan off in full, but CashCall has continued to report 
to credit bureaus that Inetianbor has upcoming or late payments.179 
Thus, the claim was for defamation of Inetianbor’s character through 
the misrepresentation of his creditworthiness to credit reporting agen-
cies.180 Like Jackson v. Payday Financial, the loan agreement required 
174  Id. at 4, 6; see also 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16527, *24-25 (the 7th Circuit noted 
that the arbitration forum required by Payday Financial “does not exist: The Cheyenne 
River Sioux Tribe ‘does not authorize arbitration,’ it ‘does not involve itself in the 
hiring of . . . arbitrator[s],’ and it does not have consumer dispute rules.”).
175  2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16527, *1.
176  See Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 2013 WL 4494125, 1 (S.D.Fla. 2013), appeal 
docketed, No. 13-13822 (11th Cir., Oct. 30, 2013).
177  Id.
178  Id. at 2.
179  Id.
180  Id.
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all disputes be arbitrated under the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation, 
and the terms appear to be identical.181
After Inetianbor brought suit in state court and CashCall removed 
to district court, CashCall filed a motion to compel arbitration, which 
was granted on February 13, 2013.182 However, in March of 2013, 
Inetianbor filed a Motion to Reopen Case due to the fact that when he 
attempted to submit the case for arbitration to the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribe Nation, he received a letter from a tribal judge stating that tribe 
“does not authorize Arbitration as defined by the American Arbitration 
Association . . . on the [reservation].”183 CashCall responded that the 
arbitration could be conducted by a tribal member, but failed to clarify 
the contention with the letter.184 However, the court determined that the 
arbitral forum was unavailable, and given the fact the choice of forum 
was “integral to the agreement to arbitrate,” the agreement failed.185 In 
spite of the court’s granting of reopening the case, CashCall requested 
arbitration before a tribal elder.186 CashCall explained, through the use 
of a letter from the same tribal judge, that the tribal court does not have 
arbitration, but, through contractual agreement, arbitration is permis-
sible on the reservation, and if there is an award, the parties may seek 
confirmation in Tribal Court.187 Due to this evidence, the court deter-
181  See id. The agreement all disputes arising out of the agreement “be resolved by 
Arbitration, which shall be conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation by 
an authorized representative in accordance with its consumer dispute rules and the 
terms of this Agreement.” The agreement further provides that
Arbitration shall be conducted in the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation by your 
choice of either (i) a Tribal Elder, or (ii) a panel of three (3) members of the Tribal 
Council, and shall be conducted in accordance with the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal 
Nation’s consumer dispute rules and the terms of this Agreement . . . . The party 
receiving notice of Arbitration will respond in writing by certified mail return receipt 
requested within twenty (20) days. You understand that if you demand Arbitration, 
you must inform us of your demand of the Arbitrator you have selected. You also 
understand that if you fail to notify us, then we have the right to select the Arbitrator.
Id at 2-3.
182  Id at 3.; see Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 923 F.Supp.2d 1358, 1363-64 (S.D.Fla. 
2013).
183 Inetianbor, 2013 WL 4494125 at 3.
184  Order Granting Plaintiff ’s Motion to Reopen Case, Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 
2013 WL 1325327 (S.D.Fla., Apr. 1, 2013).
185  Id.
186  Inetianbor, 2013 WL 4494125 at 2.
187  Id.
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mined the forum was available.188 However, just a few months later, the 
district court found the arbitration agreement void due to the “integral” 
nature of the tribe being the arbitral forum.189 The district court deter-
mined the tribal elder selected was not an “authorized representative of 
the tribe,” nor did CashCall selected an authorized representative of the 
tribe, therefore the “arbitral forum” was unavailable.190 Additionally, the 
court discovered that the tribe had no “consumer dispute rules,” which 
were indicated in the original arbitration clause.191 CashCall’s appeal 
argues that the arbitral forum is not “integral” to the arbitration agree-
ment and the conclusion that the arbitral forum was unavailable was 
incorrect.192 It is unlikely that CashCall will prevail on these arguments, 
even though courts tend to construe arbitration agreements liberally as 
to maintain enforceability.
These are just some of the most recently enforcement actions and 
suits involving Native American payday lending companies, particularly 
those who are not actually tribal entities and simply locate themselves 
on reservations to evade state and federal consumer protection laws.193 
Although there are legitimate payday lending companies associated 
with Native American tribes, it is important to note that all of the above 
cases are all linked to Martin A. Webb and all of the agreements invoke 
the jurisdiction of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation in South 
Dakota. Although, Western Sky Financial announced in August an end 
to servicing loans due to heavy regulations,194 regulatory agencies are 
still pursuing these entities, including the CFPB who sued CashCall for 
illegal online loan servicing in December.195
188  Id.; see Order Denying Reconsideration, Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 2013 WL 
2156836 (S.D.Fla., May 17, 2013).
189  Inetianbor, 2013 WL 4494125 at 6.
190  Id. at 5.
191  Id. at *6.
192  Principal Brief of Appellant CashCall, Inc., Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., No. 13-
13822 at 16. (11th Cir., Oct. 30, 2013).
193  See Payday Lending, Fed. Trade Comm’n, http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
media-resources/consumer-finance/payday-lending (last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
194  See The Editorial Board, Cracking Down on Predatory Payday Lenders, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2013, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/
opinion/cracking-down-on-predatory-payday-lenders.html?src=recg&_r=0.
195  See CFPB Sues CashCall for Illegal Online Loan Servicing, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-sues-
cashcall-for-illegal-online-loan-servicing/.
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III. Policy Recommendations
The sovereignty of Native American tribes is extremely important 
and should not be overturned. However, it is time to revisit the expan-
sive nature of this immunity, in particular the ability of tribes to “hide 
behind” their immunity in order to engage in usury business practices 
or enable outsides to utilize tribal immunity beyond the intended nature. 
Tribes have been able to become economically viable and the reserva-
tions have become a source of potential prosperity, with nearly half of 
all Native American tribes benefiting from casinos and other gaming 
revenues.196 Tribes have also been expanding their revenue sources: 
from owning construction firms, advertising companies, and engaging 
in online short-term lending.197 Although prosperity has not touched all 
tribes, in particular the Oglala Lakota members residing on the Pine 
River Ridge Reservation,198 it is time to embrace change, which is 
reflected in the recent decisions by the courts.
As tribes diversify their economic sources, the business of short-term 
consumer credit loans, better known as payday loans, has grown entic-
ing. Although most scholars view payday lending as an unscrupulous 
practice, there is a great need for short-term loans for the underserved 
and underbanked.199 Without them people’s lives would be turned upside 
down.200 There is a way for tribes to take advantage of the economic 
potential, but not hide behind immunity to engage in usury practices 
that are being prevented by regulators, such as the CFPB and FTC. In 
2011, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (“the Dodd-Frank Act”) changed the United States financial indus-
try and Native Americans were not exempt from this change.201 The 
196  See Conrad Wilson, Native American Tribes Venture Out of Casino Business, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/02/21/172630938/native-
american-tribes-venture-out-of-casino-business.
197  Id. (discussing the Winnebago tribe’s ownership of dozens of businesses in 
numerous states (reservation is in Nebraska), with revenue in 2011 topping $250 
million).
198  See Nicholas D. Kristof, Poverty’s Poster Child, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2012, at A29, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/opinion/kristof-povertys-poster-
child.html?_r=0 (discussing the devastating poverty that exists in the Pine Ridge 
Indian Reservation).
199  See Rosette & Bazzazieh, supra note 110, at 808.
200  Id.
201  P.L. 111-203, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ203/
html/PLAW-111publ203.htm.
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Dodd-Frank Act explicitly recognizes tribal regulatory authority over 
tribally owned online consumer lending businesses.202 The Dodd-Frank 
Act also requests that the agency and tribes work together to ensure fair 
regulations.203
In 2012, the Native American Financial Services Association 
(“NAFSA”) was formed as a trade association to “protect and advocate 
for Native American sovereign rights” and to “enable tribes to offer 
responsible online lending products.”204 The formation of NAFSA was 
an important step for cooperation between federal and state regulators 
and legitimate Native American tribal entities engaged in legal payday 
lending. According to NAFSA, member tribes follow applicable tribal 
and federal laws and agree to “abide by a strict set of industry-leading 
best practices205 to ensure that consumers can trust NAFSA members 
to honor their rights, protect their privacy, treat them fairly, and con-
stantly strive to offer them innovative alternative financial products.”206 
NAFSA has vocally demonstrated the distinction between legitimate 
Native American tribal entities and those who are not actually tribally-
owned. Most recently, Barry Brandon, the executive director of NAFSA, 
applauded the New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman’s lawsuit 
against Western Sky Loans,207 stating the distinction “between those 
202  See Rosette & Bazzazieh, supra note 110, at 802; contra Tribal Payday Lending, 
http://www.modrall.com/Files/Docs/Tribal%20Payday%20Lending.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2013) (writing “a question remains as to whether the Dodd-Frank Act applies 
to tribes or tribal entities”); see also 12 U.S.C.A. § 5481 (Lexis 2011); .
203  Id.
204  See About the Native American Financial Services Association, Native American 
Fin. Serv. Ass’n, http://www.mynafsa.org/about/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2013); see also 
Barry Brandon, Understanding legitimate online tribal lending, The Hill (Oct. 2, 
2013), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/325949-understand-
legitimate-online-tribal-lending (discussing the distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate tribal online lenders).
205  See NAFSA Financial Lending Best Practices to Protect and Inform Consumers, 
Native American Fin. Serv. Ass’n (last visited Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.mynafsa.
org/best-practices/ (providing the “best practices” for NAFSA Member lenders to 
engage in).
206  See Sean Sposito, Online Lender Western Sky Shutters Payday Business, American 
Banker (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_166/online-
lender-western-sky-shutters-payday-business-1061606-1.html.
207  See Christie Smythe, Online Lender Western Sky Sued by N.Y. Over Rates, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-12/online-
lender-western-sky-sued-by-n-y-over-rates.html.
2014 The Current State Of Arbitration Clauses Within Native American Tribal Contracts: 179
 An Examination Of Binding Arbitration Contracts in Native American Payday Lending
tribal government-owned businesses who operate legally under fed-
eral law, and those who seek to profiteer on the back of hundreds of 
years of government-to-government relationships.”208 It is important to 
remember that there are legitimate payday lending companies organized 
under tribal law, and tribal immunity should not be sacrificed due to the 
wrongdoings of a few.
In recent years, the need for sovereign immunity and the unenforce-
ability of arbitration clauses has declined, and Native American busi-
nesses and their tribal entities are no longer the consistent underdog 
in which the playing field needs to be leveled. It is likely the Supreme 
Court will in due time hear a case regarding the use of mandatory arbi-
tration clauses which pick tribal courts and reservations as the govern-
ing forum—a forum foreign to most involved. Although there was a 
concern that the Court, in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 
would restrict the blanket immunity enjoyed by the tribes, both on and 
off the reservation, the Court rejected Michigan’s call to overturn Kiowa 
and limit tribal sovereign immunity to activities conducted only on 
tribal lands.209 Even though the Court ultimately decided not to restrict 
tribal sovereign immunity to only on-reservation activities, it was a 
5-4 decision, with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg each writing 
individual dissents.210 It may be best for tribes to relinquish some, but 
not all, of their immunity, especially in regards to commercial activities 
that take place off-reservation. This would likely preserve some of the 
immunity, that which is used for its original purpose.
CONCLUSION
Since the formal recognition of tribal sovereign immunity by the 
United States Supreme Court in 1940,211 Native American tribes have 
208  See Jessica M. Karmasek, Head of Native American association applauds N.Y. AG’s 
lawsuit against Western Sky, Legal Newsline (Aug. 13, 2013), http://legalnewsline.
com/news/243531-head-of-native-american-association-applauds-n-y-ags-lawsuit-
against-western-sky.
209  134 S. Ct. 2024, 2027 (2014) (holding that Bay Mills is protected by tribal sovereign 
immunity and the suit against them by Michigan for opening a casino outside Indian 
land is barred since “Congress has not abrogated tribal sovereign immunity from a 
State’s suite to enjoin gaming off a reservation or other Indian land.”); Kiowa Tribe, 
523 U.S. at 758.
210  Id. at 2038, 2039; see supra note 49.
211  See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. at 512-13.
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made significant strides in economic prosperity and have become entic-
ing partners for outside business. This, along with the combination of 
increasing use of arbitration clauses, has led to some confusion regard-
ing the enforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses in payday lend-
ing agreements. The courts have distinguished between those entities 
which are “arms of the tribal governance,” and thus should be entitled 
to the same protections of tribal immunity, and those who are not, but 
there is still not a bright-line rule, nor should there necessarily be one.
This paper has examined the historical status of both arbitration 
clauses and tribal sovereign immunity, in addition to the unique nature 
of tribal courts, the use of arbitration clauses today, and the business 
concerns. Even though each tribal jurisdiction has its own rules and 
procedures regarding enforceability of contracts, arbitration, and grant-
ing of awards, any concerns can be overcome by due diligence. As 
demonstrated by the recent litigation and the ongoing debate regarding 
payday lending in general and the sweeping nature of tribal sovereignty, 
it is likely that the issues of enforceability of arbitration contracts man-
dating tribal jurisdiction, especially involving lenders who are not true 
tribal entities, is not going away and the Court will be forced to address 
the issue once and for all. Although there are those who seek to take 
advantage of the sovereign immunity provided to Native American 
tribes and engage in usury practices, they are not the majority, and it 
is vital to distinguish between legitimate tribal businesses engaged in 
payday lending and those who are simply hiding behind a false tribal 
immunity.
